

**Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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**PROPOSAL BY THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
CONCERNING THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND AN AGREEMENT
TO ASSURE THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
AGAINST THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

1. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was motivated to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 12 December 1985 by the intention to avert the danger of nuclear war and promote nuclear disarmament, and, in particular, by the pressing need to remove the grave nuclear threat facing the country. The motivation was also underlined by its series of disarmament initiatives including the proposals to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone (A/S-15/19) and to substantially reduce the level of the armed forces in the peninsula (S/19017) in favour of such a zone.
2. The DPRK's accession to the Treaty has, however, been followed not by a reduction, but by a further increase in the nuclear threat. Indications of a reduced nuclear threat have still to be given, even at this moment when the Treaty is being reviewed for the fourth time.
3. The particular nuclear threat to the DPRK has been primarily posed by the unilateral combat-ready deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in south Korea. More than 1,000 nuclear weapons, including Lance nuclear missiles, are deployed in south Korea accounting for, according to the Brookings Institute, a total yield some 1,700 times higher than the Hiroshima-type atom bomb. These have not been reduced by a single weapon since the accession of the DPRK to the Treaty.
4. The nuclear threat has been enhanced by the owner State's military strategy which involves the actual use of these nuclear weapons. A Defence Report of that State categorized the Korean peninsula as a "first-class theatre" for the use of nuclear weapons. The south Korean-based Joint Command of that State and south Korea has a mission to deliver a nuclear first-strike against north Korean targets at the outbreak of a war (OPLAN 5027).

5. The nuclear threat has been increased acutely by the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises which are widely known to be a rehearsal for nuclear war. During the second half of the 1980s, the exercise period was extended from the initial 11 days to 90 days and the mobilized forces from 60,000 to 200,000 troops. At the same time its nature became increasingly nuclear offensive with the participation of such powerful nuclear means as a carrier battle group, a major task force of the 7th Fleet armed with 1,500 nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, B-52 strategic bombers from Guam and F-111 strategic nuclear attackers and a E4-B nuclear command aircraft from the mainland.

6. Such a continued and increased nuclear threat has caused a level of scepticism at the prospect of implementation of the Treaty objectives, particularly the declaration of the State parties' "intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament" (8th preambular paragraph) and their undertakings "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Article VI), thus compelling the Government of the DPRK to seek a more guaranteed security assurance on an interim basis.

7. All nuclear facilities in operation and their activities within the territory of the DPRK have already been safeguarded by the IAEA under the Safeguards Agreement of the INFCIRC/66 Rev.2-type, which is an ample indication that the spirit of the provisions of Article III of the Treaty is in fact being respected. In furtherance of the implementation of its obligations, the Government of the DPRK has continued negotiations with the IAEA which have at present reached agreement on all provisions except one article of the Standard Safeguards Agreement.

8. Nevertheless, it has become imperative for the Government of the DPRK to be assured of its security on a legally binding basis from the point of view either of the nuclear threat specific to its circumstances or of a more balanced implementation of Treaty provisions.

9. In this context, the delegation of the DPRK to the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT proposes that the parties concerned enter into negotiations without delay with a view to concluding, at the earliest possible date and simultaneously, the Safeguards Agreement and an agreement to assure the DPRK against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

10. The delegation of the DPRK believes that the present reality in which the nuclear-weapon States are moving towards détente and disarmament, and the fact that this Conference is currently considering the issue of security assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as a major item on its agenda, provide a favourable prospect for this proposal. The delegation of the DPRK therefore suggests that the Conference will accordingly take due note of this proposal in its Final Declaration.

